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"Of Law and the River," and of 
Nihilism and Academic Freedom 
I. Introduction 
Peter W. Martin 
l 
Volume 34 of the journal of Legal Education carried an artide by Dean 
Paul D. Carrington that drew wide and intense response ("Of Law and the 
River," 34 J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984)). The exchanges of correspondence it 
provoked dealt with important issues of academic freedom and the place of a 
law school and law faculty members \Vithin the university. As Dean 
Carrington was taken to be addressing the Critical Legal Studies movement, 
the ensuing discussion also concerned the views of those identifying with 
that movement. 
Because this correspondence is both important and timely, it appears here 
essentially as written. These are letters exchanged among colleagues and 
friends or addressed to the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of 
the American Association of University Professors, not articles or formal 
comments. Personal salutations and references have been removed, but 
neither the editor nor the authors have made substantial revisions. 
·. 
II. Nihilism 
Robert W. Gordon to Paul D. Carrington 
I write in response to your article, "Of Law and the River," in 34 J. Legal 
Educ. 222 (1984), which I began in appreciation, carried along by the 
graceful flow of its prose and the wonderful passages from Mark Twain, and 
finished in bafflement and growing alarm. As one who has been loosely 
connected to the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, I take seriously 
enough the injunction that people like me have "an e~hical duty to depart 
the law school, perhaps to seek a place elsewhere in the academy" (at 227) to 
be prompted both to ask you to elaborate your reasons for thinking so and to 
suggest why I think you may be mistaken. 
I have no quarrel with your main point, that the practice of law like that 
of any other complex craft requires judgment and courage as well as · 
technique, and that judgment and courage can be t~ught; though I think we 
might disagree on how best to teach them, and I might be inclined to 
emphasize more than you the need for constant critical reflection upon the 
platitudinous commonsense ("everybody knows that women are not aggres-
Peter W. Martin is Dean, Cornell Law School. 
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sive enough to be litigators") that sometimes passes as professional 
"judgment". But you then go on to insist that among the components of 
professional judgment and courage there are certain quite specific beliefs 
about law and its practice that lawyers ought to hold as a matter of 
unreasoning faith; and that law teachers who doubt this faith should 
migrate elsewhere lest they "dispirit" or "disable" their students from 
practice or even induce them to practice "bribery and intimidation"! 
Like most people invited to take a loyalty oath, I want first to have a clear 
notion of its content; and find your account of the correct faith for a law 
teacher actually to be fairly obscure. You define it mostly by contrast to what 
it is not, the bad view of the "nihilists". I would like to set out three possible 
interpretations of your account of the issues dividing the True Professionals 
(TPs) from the Nihilists (Ns), and react to each as I think many people 
involved in CLS would react. 
#!-(Semble the most likely interpretation of your position). "Ns claim 
that law is an empty shell, just a facade for the naked exercise of power. TPs 
believe that law has an autonomous content, and therefore influences, 
channels, and restrains the exercise of power." 
If this is all the oath involves, CLS people can take it cheerfully. None of 
us thinks law has no content. In fact we are often accused (by legal 
sociologists, for instance) of taking its content much too seriously, of 
exaggerating the power of legal doctrines and principles to control social 
behavior! Of course law channels and restrains power. It also confers power, 
as it would upon you, for example, if you had a legal entitlement to specify . 
what I had to believe to keep my job. There cannot be any "official power" 
for law to restrain without law to create the "office" in the first place. 
CLS people do frequently say that law, or legal rights, are "indeterminate." 
What they mean by that is not that law fails to constrain social or official 
action at all, for it obviously does, but rather that because it is founded upon 
contradictory norms, its principles cannot constrain a single set of outcomes 
even if intelligently, honestly and conscientiously applied. In contract law, 
· for example, there is always a legitimate argument for maintaining one 
party's freedom of action and a contrary argument for protecting the other 
party's security; for every argument for enforcing the deal in the name of 
"freedom of contract" there is a counter-argument for voiding the deal 
because of fraud, duress, overreaching, misunderstanding or changed 
circumstances. Indeterminacy, in this view, isn't the product of some 
official's "distortion" of the law's command, but inheres in the law itself: the 
law commands contradictory things. 
I do not see why someone who took even the most extreme view of legal 
indeterminacy, i.e., that "you can always crank out a legal argument for any 
position," would resort to "bribery and intimidation." Wouldn't he simply 
crank out the argument? 
On the other hand, if your N opponents here are people who reduce all 
law (and indeed all life) to the product of the self-interested preferences of 
officials or social groups, you should not pick on CLS but on the law-and-
economics crowd. I think the confusion here results from a regrettably 
wide~prea_d_false sy~logism: "CLS=left=vulgar-materialist-Marxism." In far.t, 
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the vulgar materialists of our times are on the right and tend to hang out in 
Chicago. 
I do not know any law teacher these days who would take a caricature-
Realist's position that legal outcomes represent nothing but the arbitrary 
whim or idiosyncratic psychology of decision-makers. This is really and 
truly a person of straw. If this is the bogey who scares you, you can relax: he 
is not out there. 
#2-"Ns believe that law embodies the will of the socially or economically 
powerful, or of the officials who apply it; TPs believe that law restrains, 
though doubtless not as much as it should, the strong and the official." 
The bad N position #I, supra, was that the law had no content; this bad N 
position is that law has a content, loaded in favor of the powerful. (You 
actually mention only officials, but imply other kinds of powerful groups 
too.) 
Is there really a serious dispute here? Suppose you and I were interviewing 
candidates for law teaching jobs. One of them says: "Officials in America are 
not restrained by rules; they can do anything they want." Another says: "The 
rich and well-off control all the legal processes in this society; they can 
always get their way in the courts and in the legislature." A third asserts: "In 
a country like ours everyone is equal before the law: wealth confers no 
significant legal advantages." We would both, surely, have reason to doubt 
whether any of the three was adequately tuned in to reality. 
Yet perhaps we do have a dispute about the extent to which the law 
curriculum should dwell on systemic, as opposed to aberrational inequities 
-whether, for example, somebody should be allowed to teach a course called 
"Law and the Class Stucture," presenting material about the differential 
ability of classes or groups to pass legislation, influence the administrative 
process, wear out opponents with lawyers, etc. I think that would be a useful 
course, especially if taught in an inquiring and undogmatic spirit. Do you 
think it would be "unprofessional?" Would it be more likely to lead to 
"cynicism" or to moral outrage and the zeal to reform?· 
Supposing it did produce some cynicism, would the result be to encourage 
"bribery and intimidation"? Wouldn't a cynic who thought "law is just a 
tool of the bosses" usually work for the powerful, and therefore want to work 
through the mystifying medium of the law, manipulating the rules on 
behalf of his clients? Why would he need to resort to bribery and 
intimidation, with all that law on his side? Can the case that bothers you be 
that of the disaffected cynic out there who represents the powerless and 
thinks: "Law is just a tool of the bosses anyway; there is no hope in it for the 
little guys, so we might as well use bribery and intimidation." 
I guess I would want some evidence that there are any such people, and 
that they constitute a real social problem. The radical lawyers I know 
personally or by reputation are rather non-Machiavellian and rule-abiding 
in their dealings with clients and opponents; they tend to be sticklers for 
proper form, and are outraged when their adversaries resort to sneaky tricks. 
All in all, I have rarely come across a more strikingly implausible proposi-
tion than yours to the effect that left-wing law teaching (assuming for the 
moment that that is what "nihilism" means) leads to corrupt practice. 
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In any case, this discussion has very little to do with CLS. On the whole, 
CLS people have declined to reduce law to the status simply of an 
instrument of class or state domination. They believe that the law does 
contain doctrines and processes that facilitate domination, but also that it 
contains rules that restrain, and utopian norms and possibilities for 
argument and action that can help liberate people from, domination (as, for 
example, 19th century law established slavery but also contained egalitarian 
principles that helped lead to slavery's abolition.) The article from Unger 
that-incredibly!-you cite as a source of supposedly "nihilistic" attitudes 
towards law is actually an extended argument for taking practical steps 
toward developing the utopian norms expressed in law (what Unger calls the 
method of doctrinal deviation). 
Just as I cannot think of anyone in American law teaching who thinks law 
is nothing but official whim, I can't think of anyone either who preaches the 
revolutionary overthrow of legality. This seems to be another imaginary 
bogey-man. 
#3-"A TP is someone who 'believes in the law', i.e., believes that the 
existing collection of rules, procedures, and professional practices, though 
flawed and imperfect, adds up to a tolerably just structure for a political and 
economic order; so that lawyers who work competently and honestly at their 
craft within this structure, without trying to inject their "own" political 
preferences into it, will contribute to the overall good of society in the long 
run. Anyone who questions all this is anN, or at least not a TP." 
The problem for me in this formulation, if it approaches what you want to 
say, is that it makes into a criterion of a good professional what is actually 
just a particular and highly disputable set of political arid jurisprudential 
views. It says in effect that a lawyer ought to inhabit the moderate center of 
the political spectrum. She can believe in a little more regulation or a little 
less, a little more redistribution or a little less; but those are the appropriate 
limits of her range. Of course by and large our profession is a conservative-
to-moderate-reformist one that has usually, though not always, resisted · 
major structural change; but would you really want to establish loyalty to 
the majority politics of the bar as a qualification for membership? You could 
only do so, surely, if you adopted a jurisprudential position equating belief 
in "the rule of law" with adherence to the current majority politics, whatever 
it was: 'this would be a sort of customary-positivist position that what most 
of the bar believes effectively is the law. Or if you adopted a strong 
essentialist position that our current collection of legal practices optimally 
embodies, or at least comes very close to doing so, values required of our 
polity by some compelling necessity: The Tradition of Anglo-Saxon 
Liberties, the Original Understanding of the Constitution, Efficiency, the 
Realization of Individual Autonomy, etc:Under either theory a case could be 
made that disloyalty'1o the current consensus would be disloyalty to the idea 
·of law itself.· 
[It occurs to me that I may have misunderstood you, and that you were 
making a more limited point than I thought you were. Your comparison of 
teaching professional judgment to teaching riverboat navigation perhaps 
im_pl_ies a mere!y prudential rather than de~ly normative _professionalism: 
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you may be suggesting simply that if novices depart too far from the 
prevailing conventions and arguments in their legal practices, they will be 
ineffective lawyers. The good teacher will warn the novice when he strays 
dangerously out of the mainstream. 
[I cannot argue with that. Teaching any craft involves teaching its current 
customs; and one of the main objects of law teaching has always been to 
familiarize students with the body of conventional rhetorics and practices. 
But I think it's bad teaching that encourages an unreflective acceptance of 
the current conventions. Teachers also ought to expand their students' 
minds beyond the current professional wisdom, to show them that the going 
ways of doing things (or some slightly amended version of them) are not the 
only possible ways; and to develop the skills of critical evaluation of the 
going ways and of alternatives to them. After all, the whole point of the 
university law school is supposed to be that people who are not caught up in 
the time and financial pressures of practice can obtain, to continue your 
metaphor, an aerial view of the river-can see that the pilots have only been 
using one channel and the river is actually much wider than they think, and 
has many branches and tributaries. Such teaching is not the same as, or a 
substitute for, teaching navigation skills, but it is awfully important all the 
same. 
[In any case your argument seems to go well beyond this merely prudential 
view of current practices to enjoin the teaching of their validity as well as 
their actuality.] 
Now suppose somebody comes along, let's say somebody who is interested 
in a job on your faculty, whose politics are out of the mod~rate-center range. 
This might be a right-winger who wants to dismantle most of the 
regulatory-welfare state or a left-winger who wants to work towards the 
replacement of centralized bureaucratic hierarchies in public and private life 
with participatory-democratic collectives; or it might be someone more 
interesting and original than either. We will assume the person is 
"competent" in standard terms, that is, facile in the rhetorics and analytic 
modes of current legal practice. The candidate listens politely to your loyalty 
test and the jurisprudential theories on which it is based; and then starts to 
dispute the theories on their merits. 
-She might say (as for example David Luban does in his article in the 
same issue of the journal of Legal Education) that the consensus of the bar 
on what constitutes good professional practice is not entitled to. a whole lot 
of respect because much of it is based on self-serving prejudice or plainly 
mistaken empirical assumptions; and argue that the role of a law faculty 
should not be to acquiesce in, but critically to examine and to challenge the 
current professional wisdom. 
-She might say that the present consensus does not effectively embody the 
society's basic values; that it departs in serious ways from the commands of 
the Constitution, Efficiency, or whatever, and therefore needs major 
restructuring to be brought into compliance. 
-She might say that the appearance of a settled consensus is deceiving, 
because that appearance papers over a mass of conflicting and contradictory 
tendencies in the law; that the society and its members, including its lawyers, 
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are deeply divided within as well as among themselves; that to "believe in the 
law" thus does not entail the endorsement of any very determinate set of 
social arrangements; and that one can help point social change in radically 
different directions simply by emphasizing some sets of existing tendencies 
actually embodied in the law rather than others. 
-She might, finally, assert that there is nothing inherent in the notion of 
professionalism that precludes lawyers from thinking about, and using law 
to help promote, major political change; that the lawyers who helped lead 
the Stamp Act riots, or the protests of abolitionists, or the sit-down strikes of 
the 1930s, or the New Deal's administrative innovations, or the civil rights 
marches of the 1960s, all actions contrary to the then-prevailing narrowly-
professional consensus on legality, are people to be admired and emulated, 
not read out of the fraternity. 
How do you deal with such a person, consistently with your expressed 
beliefs in the freedom of intellectual inquiry? You admit the possibility that 
the "nihilists" may hold their beliefs sincerely and honestly. But what if they 
are not only sincere, but actually right (at least, since none of us can claim 
possession of the truth, relatively right?) I mean, what of the possibility (let 
us allow it to be that) that their views rest on more plausible, rationally 
defensible, resonant-with-social-experience, grounds than your own do? 
Would it then be relevant that they were "disabling"? (If a team of medical 
researchers claims most mastectomies are unnecessary, and that is true, don't 
you want young surgeons to feel "disabled" from performing such opera-
tions?) Would you want professionalism to be founded on lies and errors, 
however noble? 
Even if the "nihilists" cannot convince you that they are right, would the 
teaching of their views corrupt the morals of young lawyers? I cannot for the 
life of me see how. None of the positions I have mentioned "disables" 
lawyers from being able to "perform the world's work": they encourage 
lawyers rather to make reflective decisions about how to perform it; insist 
that all such decisions, including the decision to acquiesce in what seems to 
be the current consensus, involve political choice; and push people to 
recognize, justify and to take responsibility for the political choices that they 
make in their careers. You cannot surely, respond to such a person by 
playing Cardinal Bellarmine to Galileo: "Our Church has no room for your 
kind of truth." 
I share your view that "cynicism" is widespread among law students, and 
sometimes has a "disabling" or "dispiriting" effect upon them. But my 
explanation for its prevalence differs greatly from yours. It does not take very 
long for law students to realize that few of the lawyers they come across in 
law school and summer jobs are much interested by the notion that law 
should be a means for the pursuit of justice. Students notice that concern for 
the social consequences or political or ethical justifications of legal rules, if 
not actively disparaged as sentimental, is treated as marginal and not 
amenable to "rigorous" analysis. They notice law firms increasingly 
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promoting business methods of production, routinizing work, hustling 
frantically for clients, putting heavy stress on billable hours and the bottom 
line. They notice the organized bar in solemn assembly voting down the 
most modest attempts to reform its ethical codes or disciplinary machinery 
and contemptuously refusing to respond to the widespread public criticism 
of its practices and prices. They see even the small gains that 1960s liberals 
made toward giving the poor and unorganized some legal leverage in 
dealing with the state through public-interest and legal-services practices 
eroded close to the vanishing point, and the private bar contributing little 
beyond tokenism to filling the gap. Above all, they notice a vast and 
pervasive indifference to reflection upon the social role of the bar. They are 
unlikely to come across many lawyers, in or out of school, who ever stop to 
think about what our profession actually accomplishes for the society or 
who wonder whether what it does it worth doing; or who have much to say 
on the subject beyond something about the value of preventing blood feuds 
or the virtues of a competitive market in adversary representation, views that 
would not hold up to a minute's "rigorous analysis" in a classroom. And 
they are Yery likely to find lawyers who will tell them that preoccupation 
with such questions is naive idealism or merely abstract and academic 
"theory", misplaced in and irrelevant to the "real 'vorld" of professional 
practice. 
I mention these things not to indulge in futile moralizing but to point out 
that it is hardly the teaching of "nihilism" that makes cynics out of these 
students: it's just exposure to their chosen profession. The response of many 
students is complacent careerism. They think they are on the track to wealth 
and professional status, and any law teacher or lawyer who wants them to 
examine law and its practice critically is an obstruction-whatever this 
weird stuff he is teaching is, they know they cannot use it. Other students 
give in to a kind of numbing despair. You can actually see them deflate after 
the first-year summer: they narrow their focus to getting through, finding 
the alienating job and grinding their way through it, saving their passion 
and commitment for personal life after hours. They too want to think about 
what they are getting into as little as possible. (Parenthetically, don't you 
think that the mindless careerism and apathy of so many law students is a 
rather more serious problem than the symptom of it you oddly fix on, that 
they "pass" when called on in class?) 
Careerism and apathy are perfectly adaptive responses to the collections of 
practices that students are persuaded to think of as constituting "the real 
world". The prevailing collection of rules, processes, ethical standards, 
negotiating strategies, allocations of power and wealth within the law firm 
or the corporation or the society at large, come to seem like natural and 
necessary facts about the world just because they exist. Some lawyers think 
the facts add up to a system that is functional and valuable, others that it is 
crazy and dumb, or an arbitrary jumble: but it is out there, no denying it, and 
that makes it all seem somehow inevitable and fixed, subject at best to 
glacially gradual change. The message is: "Like it or not, it has to be this 
way." Accepting that, the careerist sets out to grab as much as he can, the 
alienated to do whatever he has to do in order to get by·. 
8 journal of Legal Education 
Some law teachers, including many of the most conscientious ones, try to 
encourage their students toward a third way of dealing with the "real 
world": this is your response, the counsel (and example) of professionalism. 
Professionalism as I understand it recommends a kind of minimalist stoic 
morality, to participants in a society whose basic structures and tasks are 
assumed to be unalterable givens. Your task is not to ask why you have been 
conscripted for these wars, or to question mysterious bureaucratic orders, it 
is to ·bear yourself like a soldier. You should strive to develop and live up to 
your own standards of quality for the practice of your craft, whether your 
superiors demand such standards or not; you should be candid and honest 
with clients and adversaries, and not stoop to cunning or underhanded tricks 
even if everyone else does; you should give your best attention to all your 
work, whether the client is a bigwig or a nobody; you should not try to grab 
credit for others' work or to blame others for your mistakes; you should try to 
preserve independent judgment, even in the face of pressure from partners or 
clients; you should not treat your underlings badly or toady to your bosses, 
etc. If this is the sort of thing you mean by professionalism, I agree 
wholeheartedly that much of it can and should be imparted in law school 
classrooms (or even better, clinics) and personal dealings with students-
though it will also need the example of respected successful lawyers to be 
sustained out in "the real world" -and that the world would undoubtedly be 
a better place if more lawyers lived by it. It is certainly a lot better than 
careerism and apathy. It gives students at least a minimal set of aspirations to 
try to live by and take pride in, while facing the "real world's" moral 
hazards. (Many lawyers would of course consider even these minimal 
aspirations to be hopelessly naive utopianism.) 
Yet professionalism, by and for itself, is not enough. It gives no guidance 
at all on what lawyers in this society ought actually to do, what they should 
strive to promote: it lacks a social vision. Indeed it supposes that trying to 
help students develop a vision of the social purposes of their practices would 
be illegitimate, since purposes already inhere in "the law", i.e., the 
collection of current practices, and in the desires of clients. The attitude of 
professionalism thus ends up recommending submission to the status quo, 
because it cannot imagine alternatives and does not think it should. This is 
the real "cynicism" of the legal profession: that there is not much that 
anyone can do about the way things are, that we must accept "reality" as a 
soldier accepts his orders. I have often noticed that it is the law teachers with 
the least conviction that the current collection of practices adds up to 
anything particularly coherent or admirable who are most likely to adopt the 
counsels of professionalism. In a world without meaning, at ieast one should 
serve the status quo with style. Professionalism is thus not an alternative to 
cynicism: like careerism and apathy, it is a product of cynicism, even if a 
valuable product. 
I think that if the law schools want to help counter the bad products of 
cynicism they are going to have to offer substantive visions of how lawyers 
can act to make this a better society. (David Luban and Richard Wasserstrom 
make this same point in this issue of the journal of Legal Education.) Unless 
a single faction captures the law faculty, which would be unfortunate as well 
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as unlikely, there should be a whole bunch of different and competing 
visions. That means law teachers and their students will be engaging each 
other in basic political, economic and ethical argument about what lawyers 
and legal systems can and should be doing. It means trying to describe the 
current practices as they actually are, and to articulate and criticize their 
theoretical justifications; and to try to work out practical suggestions for 
experimentally realizing competing visions of the good. The Chicago Law 
and Economics people have had something to offer here, as have the Chicago 
Libertarians, Wisconsin-Buffalo Law and Society scholars, and the Coasian-
Rawlsian Liberal Technocrats like Calabresi and Ackerman; and so, I would 
insist, have the people in Critical Legal Studies, whom you single out, 
completely arbitrarily as it seems to me, for excommunication. The colossal 
irony of your article is its labelling as "nihilists" the members of this group, 
who are actually among the most hopeful people around-people who think 
things really can change for the better and are committed to changing them! 
(You seem to be saying: "If you do not believe in what I believe in·, you must 
not believe in anything at all.") The students who seem to be attracted to our 
ideas are rarely the most cynical or despairing (those are more likely to fall 
into careerism or apathy), but rather the most idealistic and socially 
committed, those who are energetically seeking what Robertq Unger has 
called "transformative vocations", ways of doing work that is useful to the 
world and at the same time helps to change the world. Sure, they get 
"dispirited" sometimes about how hard it is to change things, but who 
doesn't! 
Why have I written at such length? The real reason is that I started a very 
short letter and got carried away. A second reason is that as the country drifts 
rightwards, the sounds of Red-baiting are once more heard in the land. 
Though I am sure you have absolutely no wish to do so, you give encour-
agement to Red-baiters when you brand schools of thought originating with 
people on the left as too dangerously corrupting for professional students' 
consumption. There is already a lot of unreasoning prejudice against CLS 
among practicing lawyers who have vaguely heard of it. If there are battles to 
come, the academic profession ought to be solidly on the side of the values of 
intellectual pluralism and the pursuit of uncomfortable truths. If we are to 
sink without a trace it should be because people have shown up our errors, 
not because of repression. Also: I happen to be an old admirer of yours. I read 
the "Carrington Report" when I first started teaching and thought it a 
terrifically acute diagnosis of much of what was wrong with law schools, 
enlightened in its recommendations, and written with stunning grace. You 
have too much class to be consorting with the rednecks of our profession. 
Paul D. Carrington to Robert W. Gordon 
Yours is only the second such full communication that I have received in 
over a quarter century of writing about law. The other came from Henry 
Paul D. Carrington is Dean, Duke Law School. 
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Friendly, who, in commenting on a draft that I had sent him, started his ten 
pages of single-space commentary with the emphatic statement that my ideas 
were the worst he had ever read. At least, I thought at the time, I have not 
been ignored. So I can elate a bit, along with the politicans who ask only that 
their name be spelled correctly. On the other hand, I still hold most of the 
ideas proscribed by the good judge, and have made very few converts in the 
seventeen years since he proclaimed me a menace, so it is hard to take myself 
too seriously even when I evoke a serious response like yours. 
It may be that the only real difference between us is in the reassurance that 
you know of no law teacher who holds that legal outcomes represent 
nothing but the arbitrary whim or political bias of decision-makers. If you 
are right about that, then my comments to which you take offense have little 
point. I am certainly aware that my concern is not appropriate with respect 
to all the persons having1some sympathy or connection with CLS; it is for 
that reason that I tried to avoid referring to CLS as a corporate body, and 
chose to comment instead on Legal Nihilism, a phrase \vhich I had thought 
likely to claim for their banner, but which may nevertheless apply to some. 
I am assuredly oppsed to Red Hunts and Loyalty Oaths. I was asked to 
speak about academic ethics. I supposed, therefore, that my remarks were 
appropriately addressed to the consciences of law teachers, not to any 
regulatory bodies. In light of your comments, I could wish to have been more 
clear about that. 
The point !_sought to make is a limited one, that academic ethics may be 
somewhat more constraining in the environment of a professional school 
claiming a role in the professional development of its students. The 
obligation to contribute to professional development can conflict with the 
duty to profess truth if the truth which one is obliged to profess is a 
refutation of the premises on which the service of the profession is based. 
Thus, atheism is an eminently legitimate intellectual position which any 
university worthy of the name should be easily able to shelter; but a professor 
of divinity for whom atheism is the primary message to profess ought to 
recognize that he has a conflict of interest, of sorts; he should put in for a 
transfer to some other department, perhaps the religion department. This 
seems fairly obvious to me; in any case, my remarks were intended to suggest 
the possible applicability of that notion to law teaching. 
I can tell you with assurance that the possibility is not altogether unreal. 
Autobiographically, there have been days, sometimes many of them in a row, 
when I have asked myself if perhaps I am or was not too cynical about law to 
be able to profess it. I am personally acquainted with two very able law 
teachers who did in fact decide that they were in the wrong pew, and who did 
elect to pursue their careers in academic settings in which they were liberated 
from their sense of responsibility for professional development of students. 
Those persons put their money where their mouths were, sacrificing the pay 
and status associated with professional teaching in order to secure the greater 
intellectual freedom of a purely academic environment. My present percep-
tion, which may be wrong, is that there are a number of persons now in 
professional law teaching who ought to make similar decisions, for the sake 
of their own moral and psychiatric well-being, as well as for the sakes of 
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their students and their students' clients. 
I take no satisfaction in finding that there is this potential conflict between 
our duties as professionalizers and our obligations to profess truth. I have 
recently published a review of Bob Stevens' book in which I again tried to 
explore the costs and benefits of the isolation of professional education with 
the university. Professional law schools, I own there, may be a bad idea; in 
counting the costs, I certainly should have explicitly added this one to my 
list. My specific frame of mind about the social utility of professional law 
schools dates at least from the time of my work on the AALS Committee 
report to which you refer, and which reflected serious ambivalence on the 
matter. Uncertainty about the worth of our enterprise does not, however, in 
my view, entitle those in doubt to attack its essential premise while sharing 
fully in its benefits. 
I cannot demonstrate empirically that lawyers who think that law seldom 
if ever matters are bad lawyers on that account. There may be a little support 
for my assertion in Jerome Carlin's work in the early sixties. You say you 
don't see why someone who believed that "you can-always crank out a legal 
argument for any position" would resort to "bribery and intimidation" 
rather than simply cranking out arguments. The logical answer is that if you 
can always crank out an argument, the task of cranking is ~eaningless in the 
sense that neither judge nor advocate can regard the product of the effort as 
the basis for the application of the lash of official power. Your lawyer might 
go ahead and crank out a few arguments when he has nothing better to do, 
but he is not likely to think his effort to be effective, or even a worthy use of 
time and effort. 1,.. 
My own episodic observation is that many bad lawyers are in fact 
convinced that law does not matter. Indeed, for the slothful, (and who of us 
is not at least sometimes slothful?), it is a congenial rationalization of 
nonperformance that one's professional effort would have had no bearing on 
the outcome anyway. And if c;me has no effective professional tools with 
which to serve clients, what remain as means of service are bribery and 
intimidation, in all their manifold forms. 
You are surely right that this has nothing to do with whether the lawyer is 
a leftist or a rightist. The idea that law does not matter can be equally 
congenial to professional slobs and crooks of all political persuasions. I do 
not think for a moment that the conversion of a generation of law students to 
Marxism would in itself have any bearing on their professonal competence. 
But teachers who profess that class bias is the primary or exclusive 
motivation of judges are at serious risk of being influential on their students 
only to the degree that students perceive that principle is not a force in legal 
decisions. 
Moral outrage and a zeal for reform are singularly difficult to generate in 
professional students. Although constrained by my belief that students are 
ends not means, I have been taking a stab at evoking moral outrage for 25 
years. The bottom line of my course in civil procedure is. that the system is 
broken, that it operates to grind the faces of the weak and poor, and needs 
radical reform. This could be a Marxist vision, except that it predates Marx, 
and descends more from Bentham and Brougham and other intellectual 
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ancestry. I am fairly confident that my students get the message that the 
system serves the interests of the strong, but if any have been filled with zeal 
by that revelation, I cannot confirm it. On this experience, I do not have a lot 
of· hope for the course on "Law and Class Structure" you describe. If a 
colleague wants to teach such a course, I would certainly support it as an 
appropriate exercise in a professional school, but I would not be surprised if 
it drew a small crowd and, except insofar as it preached to the pre-believers, 
had a negative result. 
An impression I have formed over the years is that almost everyone is a 
Marxist in the sense that they acknowledge the ubiquity of class bias. But 
most people, including most lawyers and law students, do not seem to regard 
it as more than a minor offense or blemish in the order of things. Indignant 
about it they rarely are. Even if they are themselves the disadvantaged. If this 
is right, your course will get a blase response. And if you are not a little bit 
careful, the only lesson effectively taught would be a perhaps unintended 
lesson that our game is essentially one of manipulation. Students could 
possibly be moved neither to the left nor right in their politics, but merely 
somewhat corrupted by the exposure. I have been conscious of this risk in my 
own teaching for many years; if you can persuade me not to worry, I will be 
very grateful. 
I here plead nolo contendere to the alleged miscitation of Unger. I spent a 
week and a half in a hammock with that article, and this was what I got out 
of it. I do not think I am alone in so reading him; and, if I am wrong, he 
must have even less to say than I gave him credit for. 
Since he adopts the affectation of non-citation, it is hard to be sure, but I 
thought that I could detect the influence 6n his work of what appears to be 
happening in the not unrelated field of literary criticism. As far as I know, 
there are no avowed adherents of literary nihilism in that discipline, either, 
but it does appear to me and to some other critics of the critics that there are 
those who practice it. There are those who do say that literary texts are what 
the reader chases to make of them, and indeed that the creative process occurs 
in the minds of readers, not writers. I hope that it is not merely a revelation 
of a political bias when I confess sympathy for the view expressed that this is 
the'sort of philosophy that has given bullshit a bad name. However that may 
be, I can certainly countenance the profession of this Literary Nihilism in 
the university, even as I question whether a person holding that view ought, 
on his own account as well as that of others, to aspire to teach creative 
writing to persons who want to write good literature. My point is that if this 
kind of intellectual annihilation is to be practiced in law, its practitioners' 
ought at the very least to wonder what its secondary and tertiary effects may 
be. 
Even if I recede from my citation of Unger, I do not recant my expression 
of concern. There is a problem. I have seen it in living color and in person. If 
I exaggerate the problem, I am happy to be corrected. And if some or all CLS 
folks can and will disavow the idea that legal texts do not much matter, I 
would be delighted. 
Nihilism and Academic Freedom 13 
Robert W. Gordon to Paul D. Carrington 
Your letter helps considerably to clarify the issues between u~. as well as 
revealing more agreement than I would first have suspected to exist. Without 
going on at too great length-! know that neither of us has the time to 
continue a correspondence in so leisurely an 18th century fashion-! would 
like to lay stress on the few points of difference that seem to be the crucial 
ones. 
I wrote you in the first place because !-along with many colleagues at 
, this and other law schools-was worried that your ideas, attractively gilded 
with your prestige and influence, might be turned to frightful purposes. The 
specific danger is that law faculties seeking to block appointments or 
promotions of teachers with unorthodox (especially left-wing) sympathies 
will be encouraged by your theory (that only people committed to certain 
"premises" of professional practice, specifically to the belief that "law 
matters", ought to be teaching in professional schools) to think that you 
have given them a respectable pretext for bypassing the normal commitments 
to academic freedom and intellectual pluralism that might otherwise 
restrain them. I do not think this danger is a paranoid fantasy, given the 
many intense expressions of hostility towards left:wing legal studies, 
particularly Critical Legal Studies (CLS), I and others have heard from 
lawyers and law teachers in the last couple years, and the appointment-
promotion-and-tenure troubles that some CLS-affiliated law teachers are 
now actually experiencing. 
I am really glad to hear that you have no wish whatever to give aid or 
comfort to any institutional attempts to suppress unorthodox scholarship 
and teaching. There remains the matter, quite apart from the unpleasant 
political uses to which it might be put, of your basic proposition's validity. 
And here I find I am still puzzled about what the proposition actually is. You 
oppose the belief that "law matters" to the belief that it does not 
("nihilism"), and worry that nihilist teachings may corrupt or dispirit future 
professionals. Some problems: 
I. When you speak of the professional as one who believes in the law, it is 
not clear how you are using "law." You could mean: the body of current 
professional practices. Or: the utopian norms of fair process, restraint-of-
power, equality, "dialogue" (as the Yale people say), or whatever, embodied 
in law but only imperfectly realized in the current professional practices. It 
makes a lot of difference. One position is: "A true professional complacently 
subscribes to the going system, whatever it is." Another is: "A true 
professional should work to bring the practice of law into closer harmony 
with its utopian norms." I should have thought that if law teachers had any 
ethical duty to teach either of these positions, it would be the second. The 
academic wing of the profession in particular is supposed to be reformist in 
its aspirations: if lawyers or judges or legislators are doing bad things, the 
professors should point that out and. try to get them to change. This seems to 
be your own stance. It seems to me a good stance; and if law students and 
lawyers often respond to it with cynicism or indifference, that is no reason to 
abandon it. 
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More specifically: is it wrong for law teachers to try to discourage their 
students from doing what they plan to do? It depends, surely. I agree with 
you that if a law teacher starts thinking that all lawyers do more harm than 
good, believes nothing can be done to change that situation even slightly, 
and counsels all his students to abandon the law, he is in the wrong job and 
ought to get out. But what if he wants his students to change current 
practices, rather than abandon them? Felix Frankfurter used to warn all his 
students off corporate practice: he thought Wall Street lawyers had become 
the servile and corrupt employees of big corporations, were very limited in 
their social vision, and were wasting considerable talents, which could be 
turned to the development of public policy, on such trivial pursuits as 
proofreading the fine print on trust indentures. Derek Bok said similar 
things: there are a lot of urgent reforms to be made in the legal system and 
law graduates are simply staffing the system rather than changing it. I do not 
think for a moment that either of these positions is inappropriate for a law 
teacher; though I confess that I think it would be more valuable for law 
teachers to work on ways to help young associates think about how to reform 
the corporate-firm practices that they are probably going to enter anyway. If 
people in the law school do not engage in critical reflection on what lawyers 
do, who will? 
2. When you speak of the belief that law matters, it is not clear in what 
sense you mean "matters". You could mean: (I) Law is more than just a 
mask for, or rationalization of, naked power and self-interest: its norms, 
rules, procedures, reasoning processes, etc. have an autonomous content, 
have an independent influence upon the actions of legal officials and 
ordinary persons in society. (Once again, CLS people would agree emphati-
cally with this: they believe that legal ideas are immensely powerful 
influences in the formation of social purposes and in the ways such purposes 
are acted upon.) (2) Legal rules are not infinitely manipulable: they do 
constrain outcomes. (This is a complex assertion, which would obviously 
have to be considerably expanded and refined before anyone could evaluate 
it: it is too shorthand to constitute a credo for an intelligent professional.) (3) 
The current system of rules in force, and practices of the officials and lawyers 
who apply them, is basically a good one, if not close to the best attainable 
system in an imperfect world, at least on the whole more good than bad. 
(This is obviously a political judgment, which if made a criterion of a good 
professional arbitrarily excludes critical idealists .who believe the system 
embodies many serious evils and could be made a good deal better than it is.) 
Perhaps you do not mean any of these things, but something else entirely. 
The point is that you have been repeating the phrase "law matters" as if it 
has a transparent and accepted meaning to your audience; whereas it is really 
very indefinite. 
3. What is "nihilism", anyway? That of course depends on how one 
understands its opposite, the belief that "law matters". To approach the 
issue in another way, whom is it realistic to call a nihilist? Surely not a 
romantic Christian Hegelian like Roberto Unger, who has just set off to 
·spend several years of his life doing grass-roots political organizing in Brazil: 
there are few people anywhere in the world who have given more effort to 
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constructing a theory of social transformation and shown more courage in 
trying to carry it out in practice: in his case at least, the proper analogy is not 
the one you suggest to an atheist in a divinity school, but rather to a 
liberation theologian. (If one wants an example of a true nihilist, I cannot 
forbear to point out, it would be the presiding genius of your piece on "Law 
and the River," Mark Twain.) Your letter refers to some currents of literary 
theory as illustrating nihilist tendencies; but surely this is so only among 
users of such theory drawn to absurdly polar positions ("if we cannot say 
that a text has a single fixed and definite meaning, we must be saying that 
readers can interpret it any way they want"): there seems to me a perfectly 
sensible resolution of this polarity in the commonsense position that the 
intentions of authors cannot determine any fixed meanings of their texts, but 
that readers will have a range of plausible meanings set by the conventions of 
the historically and socially situated communities of interpretation to which 
they belong. This avoids the twin idiocies of saying the Constitution has 
only one meaning for all time and that it can mean anything a reader pleases 
at any time. 
If one were to look around the law academies for people one could 
plausibly characterize as "nihilists", I think one would have to fix upon a 
very different group from the CLS-types. On many law faculties, perhaps 
even on most, there are teachers I would characterize as post-Realist burnt-
out libera'ls. These are people who once gave a lot of energy to, demolishing 
what they thought of as conservative objections to the active state's 
regulatory-welfare policies, objections dressed up in "formalist" legal 
reasoning; but who have since lost most of their former confidence either in 
building a coherent body of law on the ruins of the old or in the worth or 
effectiveness of the active state policies they once espoused. They know too 
much to believe in "formalism", but they do not believe in anything else, 
either. On the whole they are pretty cynical about the way the legal system 
works, think that powerful interests are likely to capture it no matter how it 
is tinkered with; and are resigned to the situation, complacently or bitterly 
according to their temperaments. As I read your letter, you yourself share at 
least some of the characteristics of this type, the liberal of eroded faith and 
vanished hope; and you wonder-is there any place for this temperament on 
a law faculty? You then go on to say, unless I misread you, that you think 
most students share this same cynicism about the system and resignation to 
it. You may well be right in your perceptions; but if you are I am absolutely 
flabbergasted that you should identify as the source of potential "corrup-
tion", in such an era of decadent sensibilities, the only people around who 
have any hope that the situation can be changed and the commitment to 
changing it! If you are looking for "romantic innocence", you should look 
to the party of social transformation. 
4. Finally, the relationship of "nihilism" to "corruption". Quite honestly 
I would not expect to be able to find much of any correlation between a set of 
jurisprudential or political beliefs abstractly described (as contrasted ,with 
the inspiriting or dispiriting force of a teacher's personal presence or 
example) and the behavior in practice of law graduates exposed to such 
beliefs. But if there are such correlations, my intuitions about them run 
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opposite to yours. Is it not somewhat more plausible that corruption in 
students will be promoted by that kind of resignation to current practices 
that so frequently passes as worldly wisdom-that is, by teachers who believe 
in nothing but the inevitability of the status quo? 
When one tries to think of legal thinkers whom one could plausible label 
"nihilists", who comes to mind? On a short list: 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 
Thurman Arnold, T. R. Powell, Grant Gilmore, and Arthur Leff. Is it 
seriously maintained that the law schools would have been better off without 
these men and the influence of their ideas? Or that they "disabled" the 
students they taught, or drove them into corrupt practices? To take just the 
two most recent instances: Gilmore taught his students a sensitivity to the 
aesthetics of legal doctrines, at the· same time he remained convinced of their 
impermanence and essential meaninglessness. Leff was more clearly a 
"nihilist" than any of the others, but a man of such transparent moral 
seriousness that his brilliantly witty confrontations of the abyss could only 
have inspired in students a profound respect. I am not a traditional liberal in 
these matters; and I do think that there are people who should not be 
teaching law students; but I feel strongly that in your condemnation of 
"nihilists" you have used the wrong standard, and picked the wrong people 
to fall on the bad side of the line. 
III. Academic Freedom 
Paul Brest to Paul D. Carrington 
I have sent letters similar to this to the AAUP Committee on Academic 
Freedom and Tenure, to the Society of American Law Teachers, and to a 
number of colleagues at other law schools. 
Let me add-though I would no.t characterize this an issue of academic 
freedom as such-that I am astounded by the distiction you make between 
the law school and the university of which it is a part. One of the signal 
achievements of legal education in the past century has been to earn law 
schools a full and equal place in the university community. The view you 
take of legal education, and the intellectual capacity of law students, would 
relegate law schools to the status of vocational training schools. 
Paul Brest to Phillip E. Johnson 
Starting from the premise that a belief in their own professionalism is 
essential to the competence and integrity of lawyers, Dean Carrington argues 
that students must not be exposed to nihilist law teachers, because: 
The nihilist teacher threatens to rob his or her students of the courage to act on such 
professional judgment as they may have acquired. Teaching cynicism may, and probably 
does, result in the learning of the skills of corruption: bribery and intimidation. 
Paul Brest is Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. 
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Carrington concludes that "the nihilist who must profess that legal prin-
. ciple does not matter has an ethical duty to depart the law school, perhaps to 
seek a place elsewhere in the academy." (Emphasis added). By contrast, "For 
those university law teachers able to keep the faith of the secular religion, let 
there be no shame in the romantic innocence with which they approach the 
ultimate issue of their profession." 
Dean Carrington acknowledges that the traditions of a university ordi-
narily "favor the inclusion in house of all honestly held ideas, beliefs, and 
values." But he asserts that when "the university accepted responsibility for 
training professionals, it also accepted a duty to constrain teaching that 
knowingly dispirits students or disables them from doing the work for which 
they are trained." 
Carrington's remarks are obviously directed against members of the 
Critical Legal Studies movement. He cites Roberto Unger's article on The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1983) as the example 
of such nihilism. The reference to CLS is even more explicit in his Quin-
quennial Report for Duke Law School. There he says: 
[I]n its virulent form, legal realism has passed into legal cynicism in the form of an 
intellectual movement which flies under the banner of "Critical Legal Studies." ... Duke 
is not presently served by anyone who can be regarded as a nihilist. From the perspective of 
the institutional obligation to inculcate appropriate standards of conduct, this is a 
significant advantage. 
Carrington's remarks are no less troubling because they exhort "nihilist" 
law teachers to resign rather than exhort law schools to get rid of them. His 
remarks suggest at least equally that a law school faculty or administration 
should act against such teachers in hiring, promotion, and tenure decisions. 
History is full of examples of purges in which the victims were first invited 
to leave voluntarily. 
Our views about the quality and merits of particular works by those 
calling themselves Critical Legal scholars differ, and so may our views about 
whether certain theories or attitudes might be characterized as "nihilist" or 
"cynical." But I am sure that we agree on this: To exclude from law schools 
teachers who espouse these views would violate the most fundamental prin-
ciples of academic freedom-that disagreements are to be pursued by 
vigorous exchange of ideas and not by the suppression or exclusion of 
adherents to any view, and that institutional orthodoxy is inimical to the 
pursuit of truth. 
I had always thought that professional competence and moral development 
were facilitated by the robust exchange of differing views about the law and 
legal profession rather than insulating students from any ideas about the 
law, however controversial. In any event, I do not think that principles of 
academic freedom apply with less breadth or force to professional schools 
than to other parts of the university. To be more blunt, I thought that the 
sort of Red-baiting that Carrington is engaging in had disappeared once and 
for all after the 1950s. 
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Phillip E. Johnson to Paul Brest 
The first thing that strikes me about your letter is its pure liberalism, so 
in~ongruous coming from a prominent member of a movement dedicated to 
exposing the mystification and reification of liberal legalism. Your letter 
expressly or impliedly incorporates a variety of concepts that I thought 
critical legal scholars had consigned to the trash can-academic freedom, 
rights, the marketplace of ideas that produces professional competence and 
moral development as if by an invisible hand, and especially the vision of the 
university as a neutral palace of learning which allows no orthodoxy to 
interfere with the pursuit of truth. Are you not at least a little embarrassed to 
invoke these long-since-deconstructed concepts on behalf of CLS, 'especially 
on behalf of Roberto Unger, who explicitly warned you not to yield to this 
temptation? (See Unger, 96 Harv. L. Rev. at 616). Isn't this controversy just 
another example of the Madisonian conflict between majority rule and 
minority rights, to which (you have written) there is no solution? 
If your letter represents your true sentiments, as I presume it does, then I 
am at a loss to understand why you choose to identify yourself publicly with 
the CLS movement. The impression is widespread that CLS members favor a 
political test in faculty appointments and promotions. This impression is 
based on what seem to be the obvious implications of CLS theory, and also 
on CLS practice at the Harvard Law School. Unless the many reports I have 
heard are entirely mistaken, CLS members at Harvard vote as a bloc on 
appointment matters, and a major concern is whether the candidate is 
perceived as a potential ally in future faculty battles. "Traditional" profes-
sors are quoted as regretful that radicals for whom they voted will not vote 
. for non-radicals. What is your opinion of this situation? 
- -The preceding points do not directly address the merits of your arguments. 
It is a liberal tradition to protect the civil rights and academic freedom of 
dissenters, including those who are themselves contemptuous of these 
"bourgeois freedoms." Let me therefore waive all objections of the "unclean 
hands" variety, and proceed to the merits of your appeal to liberal principles. 
The question now becomes: What limits, if any, would you set on the 
general principle that law schools should expose their students to the robust 
exchange of controversial views in the classroom? Are there any viewpoints 
so offensive (or just unworthy of serious consideration) that a school is 
justified in giving them negative weight in making faculty appointments? 
Hypothetical examples come readily to mind. Suppose someone were to 
urge Stanford to appoint a constitutional or international law professor with 
views on racial equality and integration consistent with those of the South 
African government. Would you support the appointment on the theory that 
the pro-Apartheid viewpoint should be represented on the Stanford faculty 
as a counter to the pervasive liberalism that students hear on racial 
questions? What about a tax professor, adept at exploiting loopholes and 
shelters, who shamelessly coaches students on how to cheat the IRS by 
playing the "audit lottery?" What about a professor of any subject who 
Phillip E. Johnson is Professor of Law, Universit¥ of California at Berkeley. 
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honestly believes that women do not belong in law school or the legal 
profession, and who loses no opportunity to express that view in class, with 
the result that women students are constantly infuriated and distracted? In 
any of these cases, would you consider casting a vote against appointment or 
promotion on the basis of the candidate's racism, sexism, or cynicism? Or 
would you in all three cases stick to your position that "disagreements are to 
be pursued by vigorous exchange of ideas and not by the suppression or 
exclusion of adherents to any view, and that institutional orthodoxy is 
inimical to the pursuit of truth"? 
I think the argument in your letter is oversimplified because it does not 
acknowledge that law schools (and universities) have purposes that go 
beyond creating a ."Hyde Park Corner"· style forum for public debate. Paul 
Carrington is arguing that one of those purposes at Duke is to encourage 
students to have a respect for the legal order, which requires that they regard 
law as something more than a tool for manipulation and deceit. A faculty of 
nihilists and cynics would be ill-suited to accomplish this mission. I 
recognize that there are dangers in applying this concept of institutional 
mission to faculty appointments, but I do not think that Carrington's 
position can be dismissed simply by waving the flag of academic freedom. I 
also do not think that you advanced the ball much by accusing Carrington of 
"Red-baiting." 
All this is by way of preamble to addressing the main point of your letter. I 
am not in favor of running the CritiCal Legal Scholars out of academia. I do 
not believe that most CLS members are nihilists or cynics, although some of 
them may sound that way at times. CLS is not a totalitarian party, but a 
collection of individuals who have little in common except a desire to 
occupy the most leftward position in the academy. Even pure ACLU-style 
liberals like Paul Brest find a home there. 
As for Roberto Unger, I would describe the man as an idealist rather than 
as a nihilist or a cynic. I wish his intellectual and political ambitions were 
more modest, and I regret that his writing is so often obscure or even evasive, 
but he is a formidable thinker and the academic world has been the t;icher for 
his presence. There may be a cynic or two in the CLS movement, but I do not 
think that Dean Carrington picked the best example. 
Louis B. Schwartz to Paul Brest 
I found Carrington's piece brilliant, civilized, and insightful even though 
I part company with him where he suggests near the end that "nihilists" get 
lost. As you may recall from my contribution to the Stanford symposium, I 
think on the contrary that every faculty should include at least one Duncan 
Kennedy, precisely so that the full spectrum of views may be presented. But 
then I did add that one Kennedy per faculty would be enough, which could 
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easily be misunderstood to mean that there should be a quota on dppoint-
ment of "nihilists". 
More precisely, I meant not that persons of a particular persuasion in 
philosophy, religion, or politics should be excluded on that ground, but that 
fantastic, anti-intellectual pyrotechnics should not replace, as qualifications 
for appointment, analytic ability, efftctive communication, judicious 
weighing of practical alternatives, dispassionate and honest interpretation of 
history, human purposes, institutions, etc. I need not tell you that many 
members of CLS fully meet those criteria. But when you reproach Carrington 
for his "exclusionary rule" you might well couple that with a repudiation of 
the view of some CLS members that the most important thing about a 
candidate for appointment to a law faculty is his or her political views, given 
that the first duty of the law professor is, according to Duncan and others, 
"to radicalize" (i.e., redirect towards neo-Marxism) the students. As far as I 
am concerned, that points even more clearly than Carrington towards the 
nonappointment, nonpromotion, and dismissal of people for "wrong-
think". 
Let me confess my susceptibility to the idea that somewhere, far out, it 
may be necessary to draw the line against "wrong-think". If one of 
Stanford's brightest graduates became enamored of spiritualism as the true 
path to legal wisdom and national welfare, wrote portentously on the 
subject, and applied for appointment to teach his insights, he would not 
have my vote. Yours? 
William W. Van Alstyne to the Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure of the American Association of University Professors 
[For use in connection with agenda . .. re inquiry by Paul Brest] 
Suppose an interview of a prospective appointee to a university's sociology 
department, and the following question arises as conventionally it tends to 
~ ' 
Q: What among the courses we currently offer, or those you think we should 
offer, would you most like to teach? 
A: It really makes no difference to me. 
Q: Oh, why is that?-You mean it's all so interesting .... ? 
A: No, I mean that it's all a lot of crap. "Sociology" is bullshit, bullshit on 
stilts. 
Q: That's interesting. What do you mean, "it's all a lot of crap?" 
A: I would have thought it obvious! I mean it's all equally just crap, and 
since "crap" is "crap," it won't make any difference to me what part of the 
. crap I teach. Listen, didn't anyone ever teach you that things equal to the 
same thing are equal to each oth~r? 
Q: Yes, well, I guess I must have forgotten that. But tell me, if sociology is as 
you say all just "bullshit", then what on earth would you teach? 
A: You really are a bit slow, aren't you?-It's obvious what I would teach 
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from what I've already said. I'd teach THE TRUTH! I'd teach that 
sociology• is crap and bullshit. 
Q: Oh, well, now I think I understand. Incidentally, thanks so much for 
coming .... 
[State the obvious "academic freedom" claim. What is its proper resolution?] 
[Assuming one found it infeasible to resolve the question (because one 
thought the answer would depend upon certain assumptions), suppose the 
conversation had not ended so soon. Suppose instead it had continued .... ] 
A: Hey, what do you mean, "thanks so much for coming"? Don't you want 
to know that I mean when I say that the truth is that sociology is crap? 
Q: Hmmm, well, I suppose you may have a point. I'm sorry. Well, what did 
you mean? 
A: Well, I don'tju~t mean that it affects~ pseudo-scientific vocabulary. And I 
don't just mean that its critical methodologies are flawed. And I don't just 
mean that the ordinary academic sociology departments is hagridden with 
duplicative course offerings overwhelmingly of a trivial character. What I 
mean is not any of these lesser truths, but the more fundamental one. My 
thesis is that "sociology" is a process of mystification quite as worthless as 
astrology. Essentially, it purveys lies .... 
Q: Now I'm thoroughly confused. 
A. Oh, how so? 
Q: Well, as to astrology, I feel much the same way as you do. But feeling that 
way, supposing there were still some college or university that actually still 
had an "Astrology Department," or even an entire university dedicated to 
astrology, given my own sense that the enterprise is ludicrous, why would I' 
consider applying for a post1on in such a departmeiu?· ... Isn'dt-a bltllke-a 
Humean sceptic applying for a post as Assistant Professor at a Baptist 
Seminary? ... What am I doing in identifying myself as an "Assistant 
Professor of Astrology" at all, in the first place, if in fa-ctfregar<f{twhh-the 
same contempt as Henry Ford once peremptorily dismissed history, as 
"bunk"? 
Moreover, shouldn't I find it remarkable (indeed, a confirmation of my 
own opinion of the place), if even after I told the Astrology Department of · 
my utter contempt for their work and my rejection of their discipline, they 
greeted me with enthusiasm, declared "you're just what this place needs," · 
and offered me an appointment on the spot? 
A: [Well, what is the answer.] 
Q (cont.): But perhaps I've missed your point .... 
A~ You certainly have! "Astrology" isn't where the action is. "Sociology"• is. 
Astrology doesn't need me. Sociology needs me. Sociology needs to be 
exposed as a sham, as astrology no longer needs to be. Sociology's fetishes for 
multiple regression analyses need to be unmasked for what they are-· 
multiple repression dyalysi~. Its suppositions are not merely naive. Rather, 
they are frequent!J pernicious. Tht:t_ not only make no contri~ution !it all to 
• For "Sociology," substitme any of the following in a like conversation: "philosophy," 
"economics," "art," "history," "English • or "law." 
- - ---- - -
'• (substitute "philosopny,'~ .. ecouomics," ""art," or "law.") 
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human welfare. Rather, they make a negative contribution. My interests are 
serious interests. They require a place where they can do the most good, 
inside a sociology department itself, where they can be most effective. 
I'm not applying here from shabby motives of seeking a salary without 
working hard. I intend to work at my job very hard, I dare say harder than 
you. But I care about people, about this perishable world, in ways you 
withered, dessicated, complacent right-wing mandarins do not and, indeed, 
in ways your professional discipline impedes .... 
Q: I think I'm beginning to understand. It helped a little when you spoke of 
"my job." You mean your real job is not to teach sociology or otherwise to 
work within it, e.g., in research, etc., but .... 
A: Exactly! My job is building a better world. That world isn't possible 
unless the illusions systematically perpetrated in this one are ·first 
surmounted, dismantled, deconstructed. My business here will be to attack 
the motives, the modus operandi, the ways you purport to "study" social 
phenomena, the suppositions of the textbooks you use, and the very idea of 
"sociology" itself. 
Astrology may at worst still drain off what ought to be the pent-up rage of 
bamboozled and exploited people, diverting them with fairy tales or consoling 
prophecies; it's not much more damaging than reading tarot cards. But 
"sociology," well, sociology is more like religion, like the religion of "law." 
It stands for .... 
Q: Yes, but I think you need not go on. Really, I think I see your point. But 
tell me how that will affect your teaching here? 
A: What do you mean by that? 
Q: What I mean is, for instance, if appointed and if asked to teach, say, the 
course (or "a" course) on "Twentieth Century Demographic Trends in 
South America," just what is it you would do? Would you first spend an 
introductory hour or so laying out why you believe the subject you will be 
addressing is essentially worse than a waste of time and ought not be taken 
by serious students-and then "teach" it anyway? Would you, rather, simply 
"trash" the materials you yourself may assign the students, doing your best 
each day to impress upon them the inanity of what they have read? Would 
you use the course instead as an example of how, in your view, the methods 
and premises of conv.entional sociology (as reflected in the assigned 
materials) are "actually" either conscious or subconscious exercises in 
political or philosophical indoctrination? 
If this· latter approach -\vould be your approach (such that the course is 
thus in fact not a course in twentieth century d~mographic trends in South 
America, but rather a course in "The Deep Texture or Political Structure of 
Conventional Courses in Sociology as Exemplified by The Conventional 
Course in Twentieth Century Demographic Trends in South America"), 
what then about other courses you may also teach? 
Does each of these then become but a repetition of the first course, i.e., the 
very same course or meta course. In brief, is every course you might present 
here. to be essentially mere variations of one mega-course to be described 
more accurately as "Another Course Illustrating the Fallacies and Class 
Biases of 'Sociology,' " (This. Time as Shown by a Critical Look at the 
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Conventional Course on Sociological Statistics, as Last Time Shown by the 
Same Analysis Applied to a Conventional Course in Twentieth Century 
Demographic Trends)? 
A: Well, I might do any or all of those things, or none of those things. 
Obviously, it will depend upon what I think will be most pedagogically 
effective. But most likely, I'll do something more like the last approach. But 
even that doesn't quite catch it .... 
Q: But do I have it right that roughly what you want to do is, more or less, to 
be our resident "anti-sociologist?" I mean you would do here roughly what 
your counterpart would presumably do, say, in the law school?-Belittle the 
very idea of "law/' puncture it as essentially nonsense, ridicule its preten-
. sions, deride its aspirations .... 
A: Maybe, maybe not. !"haven't thought about "the law" all that much. But I 
have thought about Sociology, and as to sociology, you've got it about right. 
Think about it, and remember this: I'm in touch with Paul Brest, and 
AAUP, and E. F. Hutton. And E. F. Hutton says .... (And what does the 
AAUP say?) 
IV. Professional Schools 
Guido Calabresi to Paul D. Carrington 
I just received, from Paul Brest, copies of your article "Of Law and the 
River" and of your Quinquennial Perspective of Duke Law School, and 
confess to being quite troubled by them. The role of the scholar is to look in 
dark places and to shed light on what he or she sees there. When that light is 
shed, people of the world can decide whether the vision is true or distorted 
and, even if it is true, whether to pay attention to what they see or to continue 
to live with their illusions. Often such illusions (even if dangerous) are well 
worth preserving and the scholar whose iconoclasm has been rejected is 
foolish to feel that he or she has been rejected or has not performed a·worthy 
task, nonetheless. It is not, of course, the job of a scholar to distort what he or 
she sees or to describe as false, as myth or subterfuge, what is not. Yet if in all 
honesty what the scholar sees seems false, then the scholar must declare it to 
be false even if that opens him or her up to the charge of nihilism. 
It is that honesty in the pursuit of what others do not see that is the calling 
card of the scholar. It cannot be the requirement that as scholar or teacher he 
or she call true what seems to him or her to be false, for that surely is what 
creates or fosters corruption in his or her students. I do not, when I look into 
·dark corners, see the falsehoods that most members of the Critical Legal 
Studies school profess ~o see. I also do not see the voids my late great 
colleagues Arthur Leff and Grant Gilmore saw-but I know that they 
reported honestly what they saw and that th~ir willingness to do so made 
them truly great scholars and teachers-of ethics as well as law. I cannot 
say-because I cannot know-that their teachings disheartened anyone. I do 
know it enlightened and gave confidence to many:. 
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I also cannot say-because I know few of them well, and do not know 
them all-that all members of the CLS are honest in their nihilism as Leff 
and Gilmore were. But if they are.:..and the burden must be on those who 
claim they are not to sho\v it-then they are as worthy of being teachers of 
law as those of us who do not, in all honesty, share their vision. 
Owen M. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington 
I am a romantic and an innocent. I believe the river exists. 
Roberto Unger is neither an innocent nor a romantic, but I think he too 
believes the river exists-not as a natural phenomenon, but as a social 
construct twisted to serve quite discrete purposes. He does not deny that law 
exists but invites us to imagine law in new and unfamiliar forms-hence his 
idea of deviationist or expanded doctrine. 
There are people in the movement who deny that law exists or is even 
possible. I would put Duncan Kennedy or maybe even Mark Kelman in that 
category. But I believe that they too have an important role to play in legal 
education, and thus take some exception to your recent invitation for them 
to leave. They have not shaken my beliefs or my faith, but rather sharpened 
my understanding of all that is entailed in the law. The cubs might be more 
vulnerable, or uncertain in their beliefs, but I believe that they will come to 
see what you and I and others of their teachers have come to see. People learn 
by opposition. There is, however, an even more fundamental point: Kennedy 
might be right. 
Law schools are professional schools, insomuch as they train people for a 
profession. But they are also academic institutions, and by that I mean they 
seek to discover the truth. We cannot shut off an avenue of inquiry, for fear 
that it would render the professional training pointless-if the river does not 
exist, people should not be trained for river piloting, at least not in the way 
that they have been. Every law school should confront the question whether 
law exists, and it is of the essence of academic freedom to allow all sides to 
speak, even those who would answer that question in the negative and thus 
recommend that our doors be closed and resources be used for other 
purposes. 
Lawyering requires courage, as you say. So does academic leadership-it 
requires the courage to listen to those who deny the very point of the exercise 
and then to explain, through the power of word and reason, why they are 
wrong. 
Paul D. Carrington to Owen M. Fiss 
In an earlier letter to Bob Gordon, I pleaded nolo contendere to his 
allegation that I miscited Unger. With a re-reading and a bit of time, I think 
I can demonstrate its fairness. For now, all I can say is that it did seem to me 
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that Unger regards legal texts expressing the understandings, agreements, 
and assents of others as having no proper consequence; perhaps I should 
have sharpened my diction, but this is what I meant by my term, Legal 
Nihilism. I, too, think that linger is a romantic, but not about law: I do not 
perceive a grain of regard for law, for our hope that officials will abide 
principle in applying the lash of power. Indeed, his description of 
disestablishment "rights" strikes me as a jurisprudence for Brown Shirts and 
Red Guards. But who can be sure what he is saying? 
I acknowledge that the issue of our moral responsibility as professional 
school teachers in .relation to the search for truth is far more complicated 
than my brief words suggested. I am quick to acknowledge that Duncan 
Kennedy's view may be right. If the question were simply wheth,er such 
views should be expressed in a university environment, I am equally quick to 
say that they should be. Indeed, I have no argument with your assertion that 
law students may be helped to encounter those who doubt that law exists or 
who doubt that the legal profession has a morally defensible role in out 
polity. When the issue arises in the context of invitations to guest lecturers, 
there is no argument: Duncan Kennedy, Jerold Auerbach or Fred Rodell are 
surely welcome. 
Still, there is a substantial moral problem for such persons if they accept 
responsibility for training lawyers, as law professors having power over 
professional students. For better or for worse, law schools are not pure in 
their academic obligations. Even your Yale Law School Bulletin asserts 
categorically that it is the function of the institution to train lawyers. How 
can a member of such an institution honorably claim to_perform that 
mission when he imposes on his students his view that their discipline is a 
whole-doth fraud, and that their very reason for honoring him with their 
attendance and their tuition is a snare? The most important things we teach, 
and what we teach most effectively, may well be the values which underlie 
our conduct as teachers. What 1s me meaning of the example prov1ded by a 
teacher who, however, truthfully in his own lights, repudiates the stated 
purpose of the institution which sustains him and the life goals of virtually 
every student that he ostensibly serves? Is a love of truth or anything else of 
value shared by such a teacher? Is he not by example teaching self-
aggrandizement at the cost of those to whom he has a fiduciary du~y? With 
such examples to guide them, what relations are his students likely to form 
with their professional clients: will they not be likely to regard their clients 
as means not ends? 
Consider that Unger proclaimed that my altar is cold, that I preach 
without belief. He does not explicitly state that I should quit preaching at 
that altar (i.e., resign), but does he not imply as much? What is to be said for 
the morality of modern Elmer Gantrys who preach what they do not believe? 
Should they not, for their own sake as well as ours, seek out a parish in 
which their lives and beliefs can be harmonized to at least some degree? Or 
failing that, if I can find no faith that I can preach with conviction, should I 
not seek employment pumping gas? That is far more honorable work than 
preaching falsehood, or than insulting the faith of those who trusted me to 
express theirs. 
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Academic freedom is precious, but no more absolute than other freedoms. 
Those who profess the truths they perceive should nevertheless bear the 
moral consequences of their professions, even as they cannot escape 
intellectual judgment of their peers. Indeed, in law it seems, moral and 
intellectual judgment are rarely completely separable. It may be this perhaps 
unfortunate characteristic of our discipline which invites the present 
controversy. 
I bridle a bit at your suggestion that I do not like to listen. I did read the 
Unger article three times through; that's listeningil There then remains the 
task of passing judgment on what one has heard or read. I did, and professed 
the truth that I perceive. Was that the wrong thing to do? Would you have a 
different view of my conduct if I pronounced the article an intellectual 
disaster? What effect would such a pronouncement have on Unger's 
academic freedom, or that of his adherents? 
Owen M. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington 
I appreciate your reply and the openness that it exemplifies. I do not mean 
to impose on you further, but I thought I would add one more word, because 
I think I now have a better sense of the issue that divides us: It goes to the 
idea of the university law school. 
Law professors are not paid to train lawyers, but to study the law and to 
teach their students what they happen to discover. The law school you and I 
are talking about is an integral part of the university, and by virtue of that 
membership and all the commitments it entails must be pure in its academic 
obligations. 
